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Notes
The Evolution of the "Nuisance
Exception" to the Just Compensation
Clause: From Myth to Reality
by
ScoT R. FERGUSON*

Introduction
According to Ptir Lagerkvist, the role of the Pythia or priestess
of the Oracle at Delphi was of incomparable grandeur and futility.
This young maiden was periodically lashed to a tripod above a
noisome abyss, where her god dwelt and from which nauseating
odors rose and assaulted her. There, the god entered her body and
soul, so that she thrashed madly and uttered inspired, incomprehensible cries. The cries were interpreted by the corps of professional
priests of the Oracle, and their interpretations were, of course, for
mere mortals the words of the god. The Pythia experienced incalculable ecstasy and degradation; she was viewed with utmost reverence and abhorrence; to her every utterance, enormous importance
attached; but, from the practical point of view, what she said did not
matter much.'

Professor Anthony Amsterdam used the legend of the Pythia as a
metaphor for the role of the United States Supreme Court in the crim-

inal justice system. The parable also aptly describes the Court's forays
into the area of regulatory takings-cases where a property owner
claims a public regulation has so diminished the property's
value as to
2
require just compensation under the Fifth Amendment.
* J.D., 1994; B.A., University of Virginia, 1987.
1. Anthony G. Amsterdam, The Supreme Court and the Rights of Suspects in Criminal Cases, 45 N.Y.U. L. REv. 785, 785-86 (1970) (citing PAR LAGERKVIST, THE SIBYL (N.
Walford trans., 1958)).
2. The Fifth Amendment reads "nor shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation." U.S. CoNsT. amend. V. The Just Compensation Clause applies to the states by way of the Fourteenth Amendment. Chicago, B. & Q. R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 236 (1897).
Regulatory takings are to be distinguished from so-called physical invasion takings,
where the government has physically occupied all or a part of the claimant's property. See,
[1539]
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The Court sits upon its tripod in Washington, assaulted from time
to time by the noxious odors rising from lower court disputes between
private landowners and government regulators. In response to these
cases, the Court utters inspired, though often incomprehensible, opinions. These opinions are then interpreted by a corps of lawyers,
judges, and scholars. Property owners and governmental bodies, in
turn, rely on these interpretations-as the words of a god-when
making decisions about the use of, investment in, and regulation of
real property. Great importance is given to Supreme Court opinions
on regulatory takings issues, but the decisions consist of a bewildering
assortment of tests, factors, and rules.3 It is debatable how much they
4
really matter to most property owners.
This Pythian model is typified by the so-called "nuisance exception" to the Just Compensation Clause. Under this exception, the
government is exempt from
the Fifth Amendment's requirement of
"paying for the change" 5 when a regulation is aimed at suppressing a
nuisance, even if the practical result is a total diminution in value of
the property at issue. The doctrine was created by then-Justice Rehnquist in a dissenting opinion to Penn Central Transportation Co. v.
New York City.6 Rehnquist asserted that a line of cases following
Mugler v. Kansas,7 focusing on the validity of the public purpose of
the regulation and upholding laws if aimed at suppressing nuisances,
e.g., Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV, 458 U.S. 419 (1982) (holding that a television cable constituted a compensable physical invasion). In both regulatory takings and
physical invasion cases, the claim is known as inverse condemnation-an assertion that the
government, in order to carry out its objective, should have exercised its powers of eminent
domain and condemned the claimant's property. See 2 JULius L. SACKMAN, NICHO.S' THE
LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN § 6.21 (rev. 3d ed. 1990).
3. Commentators have used a variety of terms to describe the jurisprudence of takings: "untidy and confused, somewhat illogical, a muddle, a crazy-quilt pattern, openended and standardless, chaotic, mystifying, and incoherent." Ruddick C. Lawrence, Jr.,
Note, Bright Lines in the Big City: Seawall, Tenant Succession Rights, and the Jurisprudence of Takings, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 609, 609 (1991) (citations omitted).
4. One caveat must be given concerning the myth of the Pythia as applied to regulatory takings. Whereas the Pythia had no choice about the nature or frequency of the assaults made by her god, the Supreme Court-through the device of certiorari-can pick
and choose among the hundreds of cases wafting up through the judicial system. This
power of discretionary review allowed the Court to stay out of the takings area for most of
the twentieth century. See, e.g., Norman Williams & Holly Ernst, And Now We Are Here
on a DarklingPlain, 13 VT. L. REv. 635, 636 (1989) (noting that "[a]fter a few other rather
minor decisions in the 1920's, the Supreme Court left the field of land use control severely
alone").
5. Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 416 (1922).
6. 438 U.S. 104, 144-46 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
7. 123 U.S. 623 (1887). The cases commonly cited as following Mugler are Reinman
v. City of Little Rock, 237 U.S. 171 (1915); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915);
Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928); and Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590
(1962). For brevity I will refer to this group as the "Mugler line."
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forms its own discrete category-a "nuisance exception" to the Just
Compensation Clause. Since then, the doctrine has been faithfully recited-but never relied on-in Supreme Court opinions, and embraced, as the words of a god, by legions of legal commentators.
Despite its acceptance, the nuisance exception has never been established as a categorical rule. A careful reading of Penn Central and
its progeny suggests that what Justice Rehnquist generously termed a
"nuisance exception" has never been more than a "nuisance justification"-one factor among many to be balanced-and that the Supreme
Court has never relied exclusively on the doctrine to uphold a confiscatory land use regulation. Moreover, state and local governments
have never been able to take advantage of the nuisance exception because lower federal courts have uniformly rejected the notion that the
suppression of nuisances forms a categorical exception to the Takings
Clause. Like the Pythia herself, the nuisance exception has been a
myth.
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council8 changed this. Writing
for the majority, Justice Scalia held for the first time that the nuisance
exception exists as a categorical rule, applicable even in cases where
regulation results in the total diminution in the value of property.9
The reason for the change has less to do with Takings Clause jurisprudence than it does with the current Supreme Court's preference for
categorical rules over balancing tests.
Part I of this Note examines Justice Rehnquist's creation of the
nuisance exception in his Penn Central dissent and critiques his reliance on the Mugler line. This Part then shows that, despite its acceptance in dicta and legal commentary, the nuisance exception has never
been used as a per se rule to uphold a challenged land use regulation.
In fact, the nuisance rationale has never been more than one factor
among many in the balancing analysis undertaken by the modern
Court. Part II describes and attempts to explain Justice Scalia's categorization of the nuisance exception in Lucas and argues that it is part
of a larger movement on the Court to create and apply categorical
rules in all areas of constitutional law. The Conclusion of this Note
critiques Justice Scalia's categorization of the nuisance exception, and
argues that, in the takings area, the Court should remain true to the
balancing-of-interests approach.

8. 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992).
9. Justice Scalia added an important caveat to this categorical rule: Only use of
prohibitions that exist at common law, or "inhere in the title itself," will suffice to bring an
otherwise confiscatory regulation within the exception. See infra notes 117-118 and accompanying text.
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I. The Myth of the Nuisance Exception
The nuisance exception to the Just Compensation Clause has become a staple tenet of takings law. Since its introduction by Justice
Rehnquist in his Penn Central dissent, 10 the notion has appeared in a
number of major Supreme Court takings cases." The nuisance
exception has also been adopted by litigants in the circuit courts.' 2
3
Legal commentators, in particular, have embraced the doctrine.'
Professor Michelman asserted that the Keystone Court "reaffirmed a
long-standing notion that regulations of uses classed as socially harmful or nuisance-like ordinarily cannot be considered takings despite
any specially onerous consequences they may carry for regulated owners."'1 4 Thomas Hippler likewise recognized the existence of the nuisance exception, and argued that precedent supports a categorical
exception even broader than that discussed by the Court in Keystone.15 Mark Pollot, in his book on regulatory takings, recognized the
existence of the nuisance exception (or "police power exception") and
10. Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 144-46 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
11. See, e.g., First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles,
482 U.S. 304, 313 (1987); Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470,
491 (1987).
12. See, e.g., McDougal v. County of Imperial, 942 F.2d 668 (9th Cir. 1991); Esposito
v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 939 F.2d 165 (4th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 3027
(1992); Whitney Benefits, Inc. v. United States, 926 F.2d 1169 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 112
S. Ct. 406 (1991); Florida Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 791 F.2d 893 (Fed. Cir. 1986),
cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1053 (1987).
13. See, e.g., Raymond R. Coletta, Reciprocity of Advantage and Regulatory Takings:
Toward a New Theory of Takings Jurisprudence,40 AM. U. L. REv. 297, 356-57, 365 (1990);
Douglas W. Kmiec, The Original Understandingof the Taking Clause Is Neither Weak nor
Obtuse, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1630, 1633-35 (1988); Andrea L. Peterson, The Takings Clause:
In Search of Underlying Principles PartI-A Critique of Current Takings Clause Doctrine,
77 CAL. L. REV. 1299, 1359 (1989); Craig A. Peterson, Recent Developments in "Takings"
Jurisprudence: Land Use Regulatoty "Takings" Revisited: The New Supreme Court Approaches, 39 HASTINGs L.J. 335, 345 (1988) ("It appears settled that a government may
destroy all economic use of property if necessary to avoid a pubic nuisance and promote
public safety."); Susan Rose-Ackerman, Against Ad Hocery: A Comment on Michelman,
88 COLUM. L. REV. 1697, 1708 (1988); Natasha Zalkin, Shifting Sands and Shifting Doctrines: The Supreme Court's Changing Takings Doctrine and South Carolina's Coastal
Zone Statute, 79 CAL. L. REV. 205, 246 (1991) (noting that "all members of the Court
acknowledge the validity of this [nuisance exception] doctrine"); Erik S. Jaffe, Note, "She's
Got Bette Davis['s] Eyes": Assessing the Nonconsensual Removal of Cadaver Organs
Under the Takings and Due Process Clauses, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 528, 573 (1990) (stating
that regulations of harmful uses "have never been held to constitute takings"); Lawrence,
supra note 3, at 615 (noting that regulations may "entirely prohibit" uses of property that
cause harm); Seth E. Zuckerman, Note, Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States: The
Claims Court Takes a Wrong Turn-Toward a Higher Standard of Review, 40 CArr. U. L.
REV. 753, 764 n.78, 781 (1991).
14. Frank Michelman, Takings, 1987, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1602 (1988).
15. Thomas A. Hippler, Note, Reexamining 100 Years of Supreme Court Regulatory
Takings Doctrine: The Principles of "Noxious Use," "Average Reciprocity of Advantage,"
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criticized it as a "property rights-defeating" doctrine. 16 More recently,
Professor John Nolon stated "[t]here is no dispute that there is a 'nuisance exception' to the application of the Just Compensation Clause
of the Fifth Amendment."'1 7 Moreover, state and local governments

defending strict land use laws 8against takings claims have also seized
upon the nuisance exception.'
Despite this wide acceptance,' 9 an examination of the Penn Central dissent, the cases relied upon to justify the nuisance exception and
the subsequent case law reveal nothing to support the existence of a
categorical exception to the Just Compensation Clause.
A.

Penn Central. The Birth of the Nuisance Exception
The nuisance exception saw its debut in Justice Rehnquist's dis-

senting opinion in Penn Central,20 a case that had nothing to do with
either nuisances or nuisance-like uses of land. The majority rejected a
takings challenge to New York City's Landmarks Preservation Law,

which prevented Penn Central from erecting a skyscraper atop Grand

Central Terminal. 2 ' Dissenting, Justice Rehnquist argued that there
had been a taking,22 and examined "the two exceptions where the de-

struction of property does not constitute a taking" to show that a 24
taking had indeed occurred. 23 The first was the nuisance exception.

and "Bundle ofRights"from Mugler to Keystone Bituminous Coal, 14 B.C. ENVTL. AYF. L.
REV. 653, 718-21 (1987).
16.

See MARK L. POLLOT, GRAND THEFT AND PETIT LARCENY: PROPERTY RiGHTs

131-36 (1993).
17. John R. Nolon, Footprintsin the Shifting Sands of the Isle of Palms: A Practical
Analysis of Regulatory Takings Cases, 8 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 1, 41 (1992) (citing
Keystone v. Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 485 (1987)).
18. See, e.g., Brief of California Cities and Counties as Amici Curiae in Support of
Respondent at 4-22, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992) (No.
91-453).
19. It should be noted that some commentators have pierced the veil surrounding the
nuisance exception and recognized that it does not have the force of a categorical exception in the modern Court's jurisprudence. See, e.g., Catherine R. Connors, Back to the
Future: The "Nuisance Exception" to the Just Compensation Clause, 19 CAP.U. L. REV.
139, 181 (1990); Andrea L. Peterson, The Takings Clause: In Search of Underlying Principles Part II-Takings as Intentional Deprivations of Property Without Moral Justification,
78 CAL. L. REV. 53, 101 n.215 (1990).
20. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
21. Id. at 137-38.
22. Justice Rehnquist grounded his dissent in the notion that the owners of Grand
Central Terminal had been unjustly singled out. Id. at 138-39 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
23. Id. at 144.
24. Id. at 144-45. The other exception cited was the "average reciprocity of advantage" situation, such as zoning, in which the government's prohibition "applies over a
broad cross section of land." Id. at 147.
IN AMERICA
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Justice Rehnquist characterized the exception as a long-accepted

principle of takings law:25 "As early as 1887, the Court recognized
that the government can prevent a property owner from using his
property to injure others without having to compensate the owner for
the value of the forbidden use."26 Citing the broad language of
Mugler 27 and its progeny 28 to support the existence of the exception,

he conceded that it did not apply in the present case because
"appellees [New York City] are not prohibiting a nuisance. '2 9
Justice Rehnquist's strong language in favor of nuisance preven-

tion 30 suggested a per se exception, "where the destruction of property does not constitute a taking."'3 1 The nuisance justification thus
would exempt government from paying for the change no matter how
severe the diminution in value-a categorical exception to the Just
32
Compensation Clause.

The majority, on the other hand, rejected the notion that nui-

sance prevention requires a categorical takings exemption. The Court
avoided the sweeping language of Mugler (quoted at length by the
dissent) that supports any regulation, no matter how adversely it af25. Cf Connors, supra note 19, at 139 (noting that "[w]hile the Court treats the exception as a longstanding legal doctrine, relevant case law demonstrates that the exception qua
exception is in fact a relatively new phenomenon").
26. Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 144.
27.
A prohibition simply upon the use of property for purposes that are declared, by valid legislation, to be injurious to the health, morals, or safety of the
community, cannot, in any just sense, be deemed a taking or an appropriation of
property for the public benefit.... The power which the States have of prohibiting such use by individuals of their property as will be prejudicial to the health,
the morals, or the safety of the public, is not-and, consistently with the existence
and safety of organized society, cannot be-burdened with the condition that the
State must compensate such individual owners for pecuniary losses they may sustain, by reason of their not being permitted, by a noxious use of their property, to
inflict injury upon the community.
Id. at 144-45 (citing Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 668-69 (1887)).
28. Id. at 145 (citing Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962);
Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915)).
29. Id.
30. Indeed, in the phrase where the term first appears, Justice Rehnquist calls it "[tihe
nuisance exception to the taking guarantee." Id. It is hard to imagine why he chose the
word "exception" if he did not mean to suggest a categorical exemption from the compensation requirement, applicable even in cases of total economic wipeout.
31. Id. at 144.
32. In addition, the dissent insisted that such a drastic rule could be justified only by
the prevention of noxious uses. Justice Rehnquist observed in a footnote that "[e]ach of
the cases cited by the Court for the proposition that legislation which severely affects some
landowners but not others does not effect a 'taking' involved noxious uses of property."
Id. at 145 n.8 (citing Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962); Miller v.
Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915)).
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fects property value, so long as it is within the police power. 33 Indeed,
the Court left open the possibility that "a use restriction on real property may constitute a 'taking'... if'3 4it has an unduly harsh impact upon
the owner's use of the property.
In addition, the majority explicitly refuted the argument that the
justification behind the Mugler line was that, in each case, the "government was prohibiting a 'noxious' use of land. '35 The Court observed that the uses at issue in these cases
were perfectly lawful in themselves. They involved no "blameworthiness .... moral wrongdoing or conscious act of dangerous risktaking... ." These cases are better understood as resting not on any
supposed "noxious" quality of the prohibited uses but rather on the
ground that the restrictions were reasonably related to the implementation of a policy-not unlike historic preservation-expected
to produce a widespread
3 6 public benefit and applicable to all similarly situated property
Thus, the Penn Centralmajority dismissed the notion of a categorical
nuisance exception.
B. Evaluating Justice Rehnquist's Argument
The basis offered by Justice Rehnquist for the existence of a nuisance exception is a group of cases decided around the turn of the
century (and one case decided in the 1960s) that I will call the "Mugler
38
line": Mugler v. Kansas,37 Reinman v. City of Little Rock,
40
39
Hadacheck v. Sebastian, Miller v. Schoene, and Goldblatt v. Town
of Hempstead.41 There are, however, two arguments against Justice
Rehnquist's interpretation of the Mugler line. First, because the cases
did not deal with property rendered valueless by regulations, they cannot support the notion of a categorical exception. Second, even if the
early cases supported a nuisance exception, the 1922 case Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon42 definitively rejected the use of per se rules in
deciding takings cases.
33.
126.
34.
35.
and the
36.
37.
38.
39.

The majority confined its mention of Mugler to the last entry in a string cite. Id. at
Id. at 127.
Id. at 133-34 n.30. For a similar (and earlier) argument, see Joseph L. Sax, Takings
Police Power,74 YALE L.J. 36, 48-50 (1964).
Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 133-34 (citing Sax, supra note 35, at 50).
123 U.S. 623 (1887).
237 U.S. 171 (1915).
239 U.S. 394 (1915).

40. 276 U.S. 272 (1928).
41. 369 U.S. 590 (1962).

42. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
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(1) The Mugler Line
In each Mugler line case, a severe regulation was upheld as an
exercise of a government's ability, under its police power, to abate
nuisances. However, in none of these cases was there a total diminution in value of the claimant's property.
Mugler v. Kansas concerned a state law criminalizing the manufacture or sale of "intoxicating liquors. '43 The Supreme Court upheld
the law as a valid exercise of the police power, despite its observation
that "if the statutes are enforced against the defendants the value of
their property will be very materially diminished.1 44 However, no allegation of total diminution in value is discernible in the opinion. Furthermore, nothing in the opinion suggests that the property was
unsuitable for other uses.
Reinman v. City of Little Rock concerned a city ordinance banning livery stables in a densely populated commercial district.45 The
Court upheld the law despite the fact that a livery stable is not a nuisance per se, holding that "it is clearly within the police power of the
state to regulate the business, and to that end to declare that in particular circumstances and in particular localities a livery stable shall be
deemed a nuisance in fact and in law."146 Although the claimants alleged that enforcement of the law would mean "large expenditures
made for improvements [would] be lost if [claimants were] compelled
to cease to do business there," 47 total diminution in value was not alleged, and economic deprivation was not a factor in the Court's
reasoning.
In Hadacheck v. Sebastian, the activity at issue was the operation
of a brickkiln, which violated a Los Angeles ordinance. 48 Because the
court below had found that "the occupants of the neighboring dwell43.

Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 655 (1887). In addition to fines and imprison-

ment, the law declared the place where liquor was manufactured or sold to be a common

nuisance. Id. at 670.
44. Id. at 657. This material diminution in value was found because "[tihe buildings
and machinery constituting these breweries are of little value if not used for the purpose of
manufacturing beer." Id.
45. Reinman v. City of Little Rock, 237 U.S. 171, 174 (1915). The ordinance recited
legislative findings that "the conducting of a livery stable business within certain parts of
the city... is detrimental to the health, interest, and prosperity of the city." Id. at 172.
46. Id. at 176.
47. Id. at 173.
48. Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 404 (1915). The Court, in upholding the
ordinance, took a broad view of the police power. "It is to be remembered that we are
dealing with one of the most essential powers of government, one that is the least limitable .... A vested interest cannot be asserted against it because of conditions once obtaining. To so hold would preclude development and fix a city forever in its primitive
conditions." Id. at 410.
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ings are seriously incommoded by the operations" of the brickkiln, 49
the Court applied the Reinman nuisance abatement rationale.5 0 Nothing in the Court's opinion indicates that diminution in value was an
issue.
Miller v. Schoene, unlike other Mugler line cases, involved not a
use prohibition but the destruction of claimants' ornamental red cedar
trees pursuant to state law.5 1 The Court upheld the application of the
act as a valid police power measure: "[W]here the public interest is
involved preferment of that interest over the property interest of the
individual, to the extent even of its destruction, is one of the distinguishing characteristics of every exercise of the police power which
affects property." 52 The Court grounded its decision in the police
power and did not rely on a nuisance rationale to reach its result: "We
need not weigh with nicety the question whether the infected cedars
constitute a nuisance according to the common law; or whether they
may be so declared by statute. '53 Moreover, the value of the real
property involved was only partially diminished, since the cedar trees
were only one aspect of the claimant's bundle of rights.
One explanation for the charm of the Mugler line is an oft-quoted
passage from Mugler itself which makes a forceful argument that the
prohibition on uses harmful to the public is never a taking:
A prohibition simply upon the use of property for purposes that are
declared, by valid legislation, to be injurious to the health, morals,
or safety of the community, cannot, in any just sense, be deemed a
taking or an appropriation of property for the public benefit....
The power which the States have of prohibiting such use by individuals of their property as will be prejudicial to the health, the morals,
or the safety of the public, is not-and, consistently with the existence and safety of organized society, cannot be-burdened with the
condition that the State must compensate such individual owners
for pecuniary losses they may sustain, by reason of their not being
permitted, by a5noxious
use of their property, to inflict injury upon
4
the community.
Notwithstanding this strong language, the actual holdings of
Mugler and its progeny do not provide a basis for a categorical "nuisance exception," exempting government regulation from takings
49. Id. at 409.
50. Id. at 410-11.
51. Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928). The trees were the host of a "communicable plant disease known as cedar rust," id. at 277, which destroys the fruit and foliage of
apple trees, but does not harm its host plant, id. at 278. Virginia law declared that any
cedar tree growing within a two-mile radius of an apple orchard was "a public nuisance,
subject to destruction." Id. at 277.
52. Id. at 279-80 (citing, inter alia, Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915); Reinman v. City of Little Rock, 237 U.S. 171 (1915); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887)).
53. Id.at 280.
54. Mugler, 123 U.S. at 668-69.
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claims in cases of total economic wipeout. Moreover, the broad view
of the nuisance justification in Mugler, Reinman, and Hadacheck was
arguably narrowed by the balancing
test set forth by Justice Holmes in
55
Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon.
(2) Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon
Mahon has been described as "a cornerstone of the jurisprudence
of the Fifth Amendment's Just Compensation Clause."5 6 The case
concerned a Pennsylvania statute that banned the mining of coal underlying habitable dwellings.5 7 Justice Holmes overturned the law, 58
and in so doing established that takings questions are to be resolved
by a fact-specific inquiry, in which the relevant public and private interests are balanced.5 9 This balancing approach amounts to a strict
rejection of categorical, per se rules: "As we already have said, this is
a question of degree-and therefore cannot be disposed of by general
propositions. ' 60 Indeed, Justice Brandeis's dissent, which argues
strongly in favor of a nuisance exception, 61 citing the Mugler
line for
63
support,62 emphasizes the Court's break with precedent.
Catherine Connors described Mahon as a "definitive rejection of
the qualitative Mugler test in favor of a new test balancing purpose
against diminution in value. There is no indication in Justice Holmes'
decision that anti-nuisance regulations were to be exempted from this
'64
balancing analysis.
After Mahon, the notion of a categorical nuisance exception
should have become moot. Yet, in 1977, the doctrine reappeared in
the Penn Central case, in language that made it seem an established
55. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
56. Keystone Bituminuous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 508 (1987)
(Rehnquist, J.,dissenting). Justice Rehnquist also quoted a hornbook for this view of
Mahon. See id. (quoting D. HAGMAN & J. JUERGENSMEYER, URBAN PLANNING AND
LAND DEVELOPMENT CONTROL LAW 319 (2d ed. 1986) ("'Pennsylvania Coal was a monumental decision which remains a vital element in contemporary taking law')).
57. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 412-13.
58. Id. at 414 ("It is our opinion that the act cannot be sustained as an exercise of the
police power.").
59. "So the question depends upon the particular facts." Id. at 413. "The general rule
at least is, that while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too
far it will be recognized as a taking." Id. at 415.
60. Id. at 416.
61. Id. at 417 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) ("[R]estriction imposed to protect the public
health, safety or morals from dangers threatened is not a taking.").
62. Id. at 418, 420.
63. See Florida Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States. 791 F.2d 893, 901 (Fed. Cir. 1986)
(identifying Mahon as "[tihe case generally considered to have broken with" the judicial
theory that "a valid 'police power' regulation could not also be an exercise of eminent
domain"), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1053 (1987).
64. Connors, supra note 19, at 178.

August 1994]

THE EVOLUTION OF THE "NUISANCE EXCEPTION"

1549

part of takings law. However, the reaction to the doctrine among the
lower courts was skeptical.
C. Lower Court Reaction to Penn Central
In the wake of Penn Central,the circuit courts declined to accept
Justice Rehnquist's argument that the Mugler line provides the basis
for a categorical nuisance exception. In fact, the lower courts resisted
the urge to rely on any categorical rules when deciding takings claims
and instead adhered faithfully to the multi-factored balancing test prescribed by Justice Holmes in Mahon.
In FloridaRock Industries,Inc. v. United States,65 the Federal Circuit explicitly rejected the Mugler line of reasoning that "a valid 'police power' regulation could not also be an exercise of eminent
domain. ' 66 Rather, the court employed a balancing-of-interests test
and suggested that a prohibition on mining limestone from the claimant's wetland property likely constituted a taking-despite the goverment's goal of preventing temporary pollution by turbidity.67
In Price v. City of Junction,68 the court upheld an ordinance providing that junked cars constituted a public nuisance and were subject
to removal by the city.69 In rejecting a takings claim, the court did not
rely on a nuisance abatement argument, but rather cited Penn Central
for the notion that a takings claim "presents a question which is not
susceptible to solution by a set formula" 7 0 -in other words, that such
claims must be assessed by a multi-factored analysis.
Nonetheless, the doctrine had been revitalized Justice Rehnquist's dissent, and began to appear in subsequent Supreme Court
opinions. 71 Keystone Bituminous Coal Association v. DeBenedictis72
represented the closest the doctrine has come to actual adoption in a
holding by the Court.
D. Keystone. The High Water Mark for the Nuisance Exception

Keystone again saw Justice Rehnquist dissenting from the Court's
prevention
affirmance of a severe land use restriction-a subsidence
73
act remarkably like the law struck down in Mahon.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

791 F.2d 893 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
Id. at 901.
Id. at 894-96.
711 F.2d 582 (5th Cir. 1983).
Id.at 585-87.
Id at 591 (citing Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124

(1978)).
71.
72.
73.
mining

See supra note 11.
480 U.S. 470 (1987).
Pennsylvania's Bituminous Mine Subsidence and Land Conservation Act required
companies to leave behind 50% of the coal underlying three categories of struc-
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The Keystone majority employed strong nuisance-abatement language in the section of the opinion upholding the act's public purpose.
The Court opened its discussion of nuisance cases with Mugler and
quoted the very language so deliberately avoided by the Penn Central
court.7 4 It cited the entire Mugler line. 75 It quoted Justice Brandeis's
Mahon dissent for the proposition that "the State has an absolute
right to prohibit land use that amounts to a public nuisance. ' 76 It ob-

served that "[tlhe special status of this type of state action [nuisance
prevention] can also be understood on the simple theory that since no
individual has a right to use his property so as to create a nuisance or
otherwise harm others, the State has not 'taken' anything when it as-

serts its power to enjoin the nuisance-like activity.

'77

Finally, it noted

that "[c]ourts have consistently held that a State need not provide

compensation when it diminishes or destroys the value of property by
stopping illegal activity or abating a public nuisance. It is hard to imagine a different rule that would be consistent with the maxim 'sic
utere tuo ut alienum non laedas' (use your own property in such man-

ner as not to injure that of another)."7 8

Although this nuisance-heavy language suggested a categorical
rule, the majority stopped short of explicitly holding that the abate-

ment of nuisances constitutes a per se exception to the Just Compen-

sation Clause. 79 The Court did not base its holding on the nuisance

tures (public buildings, dwellings, and cemeteries) in order to prevent subsidence damage.
Id. at 476-77. The petitioner, a coal association, argued that the case should be controlled
by Mahon and the law thus overturned. The Court disagreed, distinguishing Mahon as
involving a law that served a private, rather than public, purpose. Id. at 492.
The majority used a two-part test to find there had been no taking. First, the State's
interest "in health, the environment, and the fiscal integrity of the area," id. at 488, demonstrated that the Act served a substantial public purpose. "[T]he public interest in preventing activities similar to public nuisances is a substantial one.... The Subsidence Act, unlike
the Kohler Act [at issue in Mahon], plainly seeks to further such an interest." Id. at 492;
see id. at 485-93.
Second, petitioners failed to show "any deprivation significant enough to satisfy the
heavy burden placed upon one alleging a regulatory taking." Id. at 493; see id. at 493-97.
74. Id. at 488; see supra note 33.
75. Keystone, 480 U.S. at 490.
76. Id. at 488 n.17 (citing Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 417 (1922)). The
Court went on to claim that Justice Holmes's opinion "did not contest that proposition, but
instead took issue with Justice Brandeis's conclusion that the Kohler Act represented such
a prohibition." Id. (citing Mahon, 260 U.S. at 413-14). This reading of the Mahon majority
overlooks Holmes's plain language prohibiting reliance on "general propositions." Mahon,
260 U.S. at 413; see supra note 59 and accompanying text.
77. Keystone, 480 U.S. at 491 n.20.
78. Id. at 492 n.22 (citations omitted).
79. Id. at 493-97. Although this sounds as though the Court remained true to the
Mahon balancing test, the phrasing suggests that the nuisance exception is a per se rule.
The Court stated that "we need not rest our decision on this factor alone, because petitioners have also failed to make a showing of [total] diminution of value." Id. at 492-93. Nev-
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exception alone, but rather employed a balancing analysis, finding insufficient diminution in value to constitute a taking. 80 The majority
ended its discussion of the nuisance exception by reaffirming the need
to undertake "'a weighing of private and public interests,"'' and stating merely that "the public interest in preventing activities similar to
public nuisances is a substantialone, which in many instances has not
required compensation."8 2
Chief Justice Rehnquist dissented in Keystone, backpedaling vigorously from his endorsement of the nuisance exception in Penn Central. He affirmed the existence of a "nuisance exception," observing
that "we have recognized that a taking does not occur where the government exercises its unquestioned authority to prevent a property
owner from using his property to injure others without having to compensate the value of the forbidden use." 83 Contrary to the strong language used in the Penn Central dissent, and to the plain meaning of
the word "exception," however, the Chief Justice maintained that the
"exception" is not absolute: "[O]ur cases have never applied the nuisance exception
to allow complete extinction of the value of a parcel
84
of property."
Keystone thus represents what should have been the high water
mark in the life of the "nuisance exception." A majority of the Court
gave its strongest endorsement yet of the nuisance rationale, but ultimately held that the theory is simply a "nuisance justification," and
that a balancing-of-interests analysis was necessary to settle the claim.
E. The Lower Courts' Reaction to Keystone
Following Keystone, the circuit courts declined to extend the
Court's endorsement of the nuisance rationale and instead held fast to
the multi-factored balancing analysis. In Atlas Corp. v. United
States,85 the Federal Circuit rejected a claim that the government effected a taking by forcing uranium producers to decontaminate and
stabilize "mill tailings," a potentially hazardous by-product of uranium
ertheless, the clear implication is that, even if a total economic wipeout had occurred, the
Court could have rested its decision on the nuisance exception alone.
80. Id. at 493.
81. Id. at 492 (citing Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260-61 (1980)).
82. Id. (emphasis added).
83. Id. at 511 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citing Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369
U.S. 590 (1962); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S.
623 (1887)).
84. Id. at 513. This is a curious reversal. In his Penn Central dissent, Justice Rehnquist did not suggest that diminution in value is to be considered when the purpose of a
regulation is nuisance abatement. See supra text accompanying note 32.
85. 895 F.2d 745 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
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refining.8 6 Despite the clear risk to public health, the court did not

rest its holding on the ground that it was abating a nuisance-like condition. Rather, the "nature of the government action" was only
one of
7
three factors analyzed to find that no taking had occurred.8
In Yancey v. United States,88 the Federal Circuit found a taking
where a government quarantine forced the claimant to sell breeder
turkeys for slaughter8 9 at a loss of over three-fourths of their value. 90
Despite the health hazard, the court declined to invoke the nuisance
exception, stating that Keystone "did not hold that the nature of gov-

ernmental activity
compensation." 91

conclusively forecloses all claims for just

In Esposito v. South Carolina Coastal Council,92 the Fourth Cir-

cuit upheld a provision of South Carolina's Beachfront Management
Act that prevented owners of coastal parcels from rebuilding dwelling
93

structures if "'destroyed beyond repair' by natural causes or fire."

The court held that the public purpose behind the Act was legitimate,

but went on to evaluate the extent of diminution in value 94 and the

extent of interference with investment-backed expectations. 95 The
court ultimately rested its holding on the fact that the plaintiffs continued to use their property "precisely as they used it prior to the passage

of the Act. '96
Two circuit courts, in Whitney Benefits, Inc. v. United States97 and

McDougal v. County of Imperial,98 specifically declined to apply a nui-

sance exception and rejected the rationale upon which it is based.
Whitney Benefits concerned a federal law prohibiting surface coal mining that would disrupt farming on irrigated alluvial valley floors. 99

The Federal Circuit found a taking, holding that "[t]he government's
86. Id. at 747-48.
87. Id. at 757. The other factors were "the economic impact of the regulation on the
plaintiff" and "the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct investmentbacked expectations." Id. (citing Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211,
224 (1986)).
88. 915 F.2d 1534 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
89. Id. at 1536.
90. Id. at 1539. The court distinguished Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915),
in which the claimants alleged a 87.5% diminution, but no taking was found, observing that
the takings analysis involves more than mere numerical loss. Yancey, 915 F.2d at 1541.
91. Yancey, 915 F.2d at 1540.
92. 939 F.2d 165 (4th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 3027 (1992).
93. Id. at 167. A different provision of the Beachfront Management Act was challenged in Lucas v- South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992).
94. Esposito, 939 F.2d at 169-70.
95. Id. at 170.
96. Id.
97. 926 F.2d 1169 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 406 (1991).
98. 942 F.2d 668 (9th Cir. 1991).
99. Whitney Benefits, 926 F.2d at 1170-71.
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effort to visualize and then to apply to this case a 'nuisance exception'
that would justify the total uncompensated destruction of Benefits'
investment-backed expectations

.

.

.

is twice flawed." 100

First,

Supreme Court precedent did not stand for a per se nuisance exception; 01 second, since the Act expressly allowed a significant amount of
"grandfather clause" surface mining in alluvial valley floors, "all
[such] mining was not in itself a 'nuisance."' 0 2
McDougal concerned a floodway ordinance challenged as a taking of the claimant's property. While not addressing the nuisance exception by name, the Ninth Circuit succinctly rejected the rationale
behind it:
We cannot agree that any legitimate purpose automatically trumps
the deprivation of all economically viable use, such that whenever a
regulation has a health or safety purpose, no compensation is ever
required even if the land owner is thereby denied all use of his property. We read the Supreme Court as requiring us to balance the
strength of the public interest against the severity of the private
deprivation.' 0 3

Thus, the circuit courts have not been taken in by the Supreme
Court's nuisance exception dicta, commonly argued by legal commentators to have established a categorical exception to the Just Compensation Clause.
H. Categorization of the Nuisance Exception in Lucas
Although the Supreme Court has never fully embraced the nuisance exception, and the circuit courts have uniformly and consistently rejected it, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council'0 4 turned
the legal status of the nuisance exception on its head. Rather than
recognizing the proper place of the theory as only one factor among
many in the balancing test prescribed by precedent, the Lucas majority transformed the nuisance exception into a true, categorical exception to the Takings Clause. The nuisance exception established in
Lucas is, however, severely restricted in scope-only the prevention
of common-law nuisances or other restrictions inherent in an owner's
fee simple will fall within the exception. While this restriction of the
doctrine to common-law principles narrows its applicability, the categorical nature of the exception represents a disturbing trend in takings
jurisprudence.
100. Id. at 1176.
101. Id. The court pointed out that the Keystone Court considered both the nature of
the state interest and the extent of diminution in value. Id. (citing Keystone Bituminous
Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 470 (1987)).

102. Id.
103. McDougal v. County of Imperial, 942 F.2d 668, 676 (9th Cir. 1991).
104. 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992).
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Lucas

Lucas is a rare case: Not only did a claimant allege a total diminution in value, but his allegation was supported by the trial court's

factual findings. 105 This unusual-some might say imaginaryl06-fac-

tual posture allowed the Court to directly hold for the first time that
the nuisance justification is a per se rule applicable even in cases of
total diminution in value. The Court went on, however, to strictly
limit the scope of the nuisance exception to traditional public nuisances and other common-law restrictions.
In 1986, South Carolina developer David Lucas bought, for

nearly a million dollars, two of the remaining beachfront lots in a residential development he had helped to create on the Isle of Palms, a
barrier island east of Charleston. 10 7 Lucas and other developers had
begun to develop the area in the late 1970s, at the same time that the
state embarked on a regulatory program aimed at protecting the
coastal zone.1 0 8 Although the scope of the law's permit requirements
was relatively narrow for the next nine years, the beach erosion that
occurred over the same time period was substantial. 0 9 In 1988, the
South Carolina legislature finally passed a stricter regulation, the
Beachfront Management Act, 10 which expanded the protected zone
landward and encompassed Lucas's lots.'
Lucas sued, and the trial
105. Id. at 2896.
106. Justice Blackmun, in his dissent, sharply criticized the majority for accepting this
factual finding. "This finding is almost certainly erroneous.... I question the wisdom of
deciding an issue based on a factual premise that does not exist in this case, and in the
judgment of the Court will exist in the future only in 'extraordinary circumstance[s]."' Id.
at 2908 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Indeed, during oral argument Justice Blackmun asked
Lucas's attorney, "Are you saying Mr. Lucas's land was 'completely worthless?' . . . Would
you give it to me?" The attorney replied, "Yes, if the taxes were paid on it." Arguments
Before the Court, 60 U.S.L.W. 3609, 3609 (Mar. 10, 1992).
In a separate statement, Justice Souter said he would have dismissed the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted: "Because the questionable conclusion of total deprivation
cannot be reviewed . . . there is little utility in attempting to deal with this case on the
merits." Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2925 (Souter, J.).
107. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2889. Each lot was sandwiched between parcels containing
preexisting homes. Id.
108. Id. The South Carolina legislature enacted the Coastal Zone Management Act,
S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 48-39-10 to 48-39-220 (Law. Co-op. 1987), in response to the federal
Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-64 (Supp. IV 1992).
109. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2905 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
110. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 48-39-250 to 48-39-360 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1993).
111. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2889. The Act prohibited the construction of dwelling structures and, in a crucial oversight, did not originally include a provision for variances or
special exceptions. Id. at 2889-90. This failing was remedied by a 1990 amendment, but the
amendment was deemed irrelevant to the case at bar. Id. at 2890-91.
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court found that his property had been rendered "valueless" by the
Act. 112 The Supreme Court affirmed.
Speaking through Justice Scalia, the majority initially denied that
suppressing nuisances has the force of a per se exception, observing
that "it [is] self-evident that noxious-use logic cannot serve as a touchstone to distinguish regulatory 'takings'-which require compensation-from regulatory deprivations that do not require
compensation. 11 3 The Court then bolstered this assertion by citing
the Keystone dissent for the proposition that "[n]one of [our cases]
that employed the logic of 'harmful use' prevention to sustain a regulation involved an allegation that
the regulation wholly eliminated the
1 4
value of the claimant's land. "
Based on these introductory remarks, one would expect the
Court to hold, finally, that precedent does not support the notion that
nuisance prevention provides a categorical exception to the takings
guarantee. One might even expect a full return to the traditional
weighing and balancing test."15
But rather than expose the hollowness of the nuisance exception
and do away with it altogether, the Court solidified the exception as a
categorical rule. "Where the State seeks to sustain regulation that deprives land of all economically beneficial use, we think it may resist
compensation only if the logically antecedent inquiry into the nature
of the owner's estate shows- that the proscribed use interests were not
116
part of his title to begin with."
So, despite reluctance by both the majority and the dissent in
Keystone to label nuisance prevention a per se exception, and despite
the rhetoric questioning the validity of a per se exception in Lucas, the
Court has, for now, decided that the nuisance exception does exist as a
per se exception to the Just Compensation Clause, applicable to protect a regulation even if its effect is a total diminution in value.
But while the majority affirmed the categorical status of the nuisance exception with one hand, with the other it greatly restricted the
range of uses that may be regulated with impunity. Perhaps in response to the broad language used to describe the nuisance justifica112. Id. at 2890.
113. Id. at 2899.
114. Id. (citing Keystone v. Bituminous coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 51314 (1987) (Rehnquist, C.3., dissenting)). In a footnote, the majority cited the Mugler line
of cases, with parenthetical observations that they did not involve proscriptions on all use.
Id at 2899 n.13.
115. Under a balancing-of-interests analysis it would not be difficult to find a taking in
this case, given the assumption of total economic deprivation combined with the debatable
urgency of the state's interest.
116. Id. at 2899.
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tion in Keystone, 117 the Lucas Court narrowly circumscribed the kind
of state action that could invoke a nuisance exception in the future:
"Any limitation so severe cannot be newly legislated or decreed (without compensation), but must inhere in the title itself, in the restrictions that background principles of the State's law of property and
nuisance already place upon land ownership." 118 Thus, the Lucas decision worked a double-edged change in takings law: It solidified the
nuisance exception as a per se exception, but restricted its scope.
B.

Effect of Lucas on Takings Law

In the wake of Lucas, government agencies defending inverse
condemnation claims will likely resurrect a number of common-law
doctrines that restrict land use. In addition to nuisance, three common-law theories with support in modern case law may qualify as
"background principles" within the meaning of Lucas.
First is the public trust doctrine, which dictates that all lands submerged by tidal waters are held in trust for the public, and that the
landowner's right to use or alter the land may be restricted by the
states if the proposed use will impair public rights. 119 This theory has
been employed by modern state courts to uphold restrictions on the
use of public trust lands' 20 and appears to be a viable and legitimate
common-law theory likely to "survive" Lucas.
The second theory is the "natural state" rationale first suggested
in Just v. Marinette County.12 1 Based on an expanded notion of the
public trust doctrine, the theory holds that a state government may
prevent a landowner from changing the natural character of the
owner's land-for example, by filling wetlands-if such a change will
harm the public interest in water and waterways. Although many
117. In Keystone, the majority expanded the nuisance justification to include "nuisance-like" uses of land as well as traditional public nuisances. Keystone, 480 U.S. at 49192. See supra notes 77-78 and accompanying text.
118. Lucas, 112 S.Ct. at 2900. It could have been expected that the wide latitude given
the nuisance justification in Keystone would be pared back, but confining the nuisance
exception to common-law nuisance and background principles was a surprise, evidently
created ipse dixit. The Court cited no authority for this new rule, and throughout its discussion justifying the rule the Court cited cases only by analogy. See id. at 2899-900. Indeed, the source of the rule seems limited to the Court's own reasoning.
119. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469 (1988); Illinois Cent. R.R.
v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892); Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resources Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MIcH. L. REv. 471 (1970).
120. See, e.g., Krieter v. Chiles, 595 So. 2d 111, 112 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992); Blue
Water Isles v. Department of Natural Resources, 431 N.W.2d 53, 58 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988);
Orion Corp. v. State, 747 P.2d 1062, 1073 (Wash. 1987).
121. 201 N.W.2d 761 (Wis. 1972).
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states embraced this theory in the wake of the Just case, 122 other state
courts have rejected the "natural state" reasoning. 123 It is questionable whether many states-or the Supreme Court-would accept it today as a defense to a takings claim.
The third doctrine, known as the federal navigable water servitude, holds that the federal government may interfere with private
ownership of lands adjacent to (or submerged beneath) navigable waterways. 24 This doctrine has also come under criticism, most notably
in a 1986 Federal Circuit case, FloridaRock Industries, Inc. v. United
States,125 in which the court stated that "the old 'navigation servitude,'
often used to excuse what looked suspiciously like takings, is no
26
longer available for that duty in regulatory taking cases.""
In addition, common-law theories have been used to impose servitudes on private coastal land. One commentator described four. theories often used to protect the public's right of access to privately
owned beaches: prescriptive easements (requiring continuous, "notorious," and adverse use of the beach by the public for a certain period
of time); implied dedication (a quasi-contractual theory whereby the
landowner's acquiescence to public use of the owner's beach implies
an intent to dedicate the land, and the public's use implies acceptance); the public trust doctrine; and the customary rights doctrine
(whereby a certain use on a defined area of land becomes legally established for that area after a long time). 27
Furthermore, it must be remembered that the holding of Lucas
applies only in the rare case where a total diminution in value is
found. There is every reason to expect that, as state and local governments become more experienced and savvy in the land use regulation
game, future wetlands, open space, and coastal zone regulations will
avoid the flaws that damned South Carolina's Beachfront Management Act. Legislation can contain several elements which will avoid a
takings claim: (1) a provision for hardship variances and special exceptions; (2) offsetting compensation, such as transferable develop122. See, e.g., Gardner v. New Jersey Pinelands Comm'n, 593 A.2d 251,254 (NJ. 1991);
Usdin v. State Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 414 A.2d 280, 288 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div.
1980), affd per curiam, 430 A.2d 949 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1981); Carter v. South
Carolina Coastal Council, 314 S.E.2d 327,328 (S.C. 1984); M&I Marshall & Ilsley Bank v.
Town of Somers, 414 N.W.2d 824, 830 (Wis. 1987).
123. See, e.g., Gil v. Inland Wetlands & Watercourses Agency, 593 A.2d 1368 (Conn.
1991); Vatalaro v. Department of Envtl. Regulation, 601 So. 2d 1223 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1992); Sheerr v. Evesham Township, 445 A.2d 46 (NJ. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1982).
124. See Boone v. United States, 944 F.2d 1489, 1494 (9th Cir. 1991); DAN TARLOCK,
LAW OF WATER RIGHTS AND RESOURCES § 9.04[2][a] (1990).
125. 791 F.2d 893 (Fed. Cir. 1986), cert denied, 479 U.S. 1053 (1987).
126. Id. at 900 (interpreting Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 172 (1979)).
127. Jo Anne C. Long, Note, McDonald v. Halvorson: Oregon's Beach Access Law
Revisited, 20 ENVT. L. 1001, 1005-13 (1990).
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ment rights; 128 and (3) legislative findings that ground the restriction
in some aspect of the common law, such as nuisance or the public trust
doctrine.
But the lower courts, in an effort to anticipate where the Supreme
Court is heading, often embrace Supreme Court takings cases with
wide latitude. While most takings cases are decided on narrow
grounds, and are ostensibly limited to their unique facts, their reasoning and dicta often spill across wide areas of takings law. Lower court
cases decided in the wake of Nollan v. California Coastal Commission129 provide a prime example. Nollan concerned the validity of a

Coastal Commission regulation conditioning the renovation of a shore
home on a beach easement. 130 The case was decided on the ground
that no "nexus" existed between the perceived harm and the exaction
imposed.' 31 Technically, this holding has little import for regulatory
takings law, since most laws directly address the harm at which they
are aimed. Indeed, the Court did not raise the "nexus" issue again
until earlier this year in Dolan v. City of Tigard. 32 But because Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, used the term "nexus" to refer to
the idea that a land use law must substantially further a state interest,
"speculation flourished as to whether this implied a stricter standard
of judicial review and whether such a standard adheres to the narrow
facts of the case, or whether it generally should be applied to regulatory takings cases.' 33 In response, the New York Court of Appeals
"invented three separate types of134
per se takings categories based on
Scalia's new language" in Nollan.
Given this tendency, Justice Blackmun's fear that "the Court's
new policies will spread beyond the narrow confines of the present
case"'135 is well-founded. We can expect that common-law background principles of takings law will figure prominently in the balancing analysis undertaken in the majority of cases and, perhaps, will lead
courts to find that a given regulation that falls short of a total taking is
nonetheless invalid because its goals were not addressed at common
law.
128. The grant of TDRs to Penn Cent. Transportation, while not dispositive, was an
important factor in the Court's conclusion that no taking had occurred in that case. See
Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 137 (1978).
129. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
130. Id. at 827.
131. Id. at 837.
132. 114 S. Ct. 2309, 2317-18 (1994).
133. Nolon, supra note 17, at 12 (citing Nollan, 483 U.S. at 825 n.3).
134. Id. at 12 (citing Seawall Assocs. v. City of New York, 542 N.E.2d 1059 (N.Y.
1989)).
135. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2904 (1992) (Blackmun,
J., dissenting).
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This fear highlights one potential flaw with the precedent set by
Lucas. Most of the regulations challenged on takings grounds today
are based on concerns-with environmental protection, water pollution, fish and wildlife-that did not exist at common law or in the first
century of our nation's development. The Keystone decision recognized this implicitly, and thus allowed the former nuisance justification to broaden into a "nuisance-like" justification, acknowledging
that modern concerns call for modern legal solutions. 136 In Lucas,
however, Justice Scalia reined in the exception, and in all likelihood
chilled the extent to which future courts will approve severe land use
restrictions, regardless of the weight of their purpose.
C. Categorization of Takings Law

Far more disturbing than the risk that takings jurisprudence will,
as a result of Lucas, become bogged down in common-law doctrines is
the trend toward per se rules and categorization that the opinion represents. The categorization of takings law not only subverts (and essentially disregards) Justice Holmes's
admonition against reliance on
"general propositions" in Mahon, 37 but it risks ossifying the state of
the law.
Justice Scalia's predilection for categorizing constitutional law 38
stands out as the dominant theme of the Lucas opinion. For example,
he sets forth the "total diminution in value" test as a per se rule applicable to the merits of the case. 139 He then undertakes a lengthy defense of the test, citing Agins v. Tiburon, 40 but conceding, "[w]e have
never set forth the justification" for the test.' 41 In support of the rule,
Justice Scalia offers numerous citations to a dissenting opinion in San
Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. San Diego, 42 but after two pages of discussion he merely grounds the existence of the categorical rule on his
belief that "there are good reasons" for the rule. 43 It is hard to
fathom why so much time was spent explaining the total diminution
136. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 491 n.20 (1987).
137. Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 416 (1922).
138. See Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 1175
(1989).
139. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2899-900. As Justice Stevens succinctly observed in his dissent, "the Court is doubly in error. The categorical rule the Court establishes [the total
diminution in value test] is an unsound and unwise addition to the law and the Court's
formulation of the [nuisance] exception to that rule is too rigid and too narrow." Id. at
2918 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
140. 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
141. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2894.
142. 450 U.S. 621, 636 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
143. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2895. Justice Stevens questioned the legitimacy of this effort:
"Although in dicta we have sometimes recited that a law 'effects a taking if [it] ... denies
an owner economically viable use of his land,' our rulings have rejected such an absolute
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test (since it was already an oft-cited factor in the balancing analysis1 44) unless the purpose was to add it to the growing collection of
145
categorical rules in the takings basket.

This desire to categorize takings jurisprudence explains the apparent 180-degree shift in the status of the nuisance exception manifested in Lucas. While both Supreme Court and lower court law
could have easily sanctioned a movement back to the nuisance justification, and although Justice Scalia typically has aligned himself with
landowners in takings cases, 146 the Lucas decision provides regulators
with a powerful weapon to defend tough land use restrictions. 147 The

reason for this unlikely move was that it allowed Justice Scalia to categorize yet another aspect of takings law.
The fundamental flaw with this categorization trend is that it is
disingenuous. Contrary to categorization's ostensible purpose, judges

are not bound to follow "the law" as expressed in a categorical rule
because they themselves often decide which rule to apply to a given
case. By choosing the rule, judges choose the outcome just as surely
as if they had undertaken an explicit balancing analysis. The difference, under a rules-based system, is that the balancing occurs behind
the scenes, making many outcomes appear deceptively simple 148 while
position." Id. at 2918-19 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Agins, 447 U.S. at 260) (citation
omitted).
144. See, e.g., Id. at 2918-19 (Stevens, J.,dissenting); Agins at 262.
145. Before Lucas this collection had included only one per se rule-that physical invasions caused by government actions always result in takings. Loretto v. Teleprompter
Manhattan CATV, 458 U.S. 419, 426 (1982).
146. See Lucas, 112 S.Ct. at 2894-95 (Scalia, J.)(noting that "regulations that leave the
owner of land without economically beneficial or productive options for its use ... carry
with them a heightened risk that private property is being pressed into some form of public
service under the guise of mitigating serious public harm"); Nollan v. California Coastal
Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 831 (1987) (Scalia, J.) ("To say that the appropriation of a public
easement across a landowner's premises does not constitute the taking of a property interest.., is to use words in a manner that deprives them of all their ordinary meaning."); First
English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 318 (1987)
(Scalia, J.) (joining a majority opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist that states "'temporary'
takings which, as here, deny a landowner all use of his property, are not different in kind
from permanent takings, for which the Constitution clearly requires compensation").
147. Of course, it may be problematic to fit certain regulations, reflecting thoroughly
modern concerns, into a common-law mold. But if this can be accomplished, regulators
will have a trump card to defend future takings claims.
148. A good example of this phenomenon is Fourth Amendment interpretation. When
deciding what constitutes a "search" the Court has, over the years, fashioned a body of per
se rules-categories of government activity that do not implicate the Fourth Amendment's
reasonableness and warrant requirements because they do not infringe on a citizen's "reasonable expectation of privacy." Thus, without having to obtain a warrant or otherwise
demonstrate probable cause, the government may inspect garbage left at a curb, California
v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988); enter and inspect "open fields," even if fenced off and
posted with "no trespassing" signs, Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984); make
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concealing the true choices the judges have made between the competing interests in the cases. Under a true balancing analysis, on the
other hand, judges explicitly weigh the competing interests, giving reasons for decisions that reveal the underlying value judgments. 149
Justice Scalia's categorical nuisance exception sets forth a deceptively simple test for noncompensable land use regulation: The restriction must fit into the common-law definition of nuisance, or
another restriction inherent in the title.150 The difficulty, and balancing, will come when courts decide whether a given use restriction has
existed long enough to "inhere in the title." In the case of wetlands
protection, which has been a concern for a few decades but probably
not long enough to count as tradition, this inquiry would logically turn
on the subjective opinion of the judge. If judges disapprove of the
use, they can cite to the public trust doctrine, or to another commonlaw doctrine, and uphold the regulation. If, on the other hand, judges
disapprove of the regulation, or feels it goes "too far," they can simply
observe that wetlands regulations did not exist at common law and
therefore fall outside the exception, thereby overturning the law.
Thus, the adoption of categorical rules in the takings area is a futile
attempt to prevent balancing of interests because questions of interpretation lurk within every per se rule.

visual observations through the broken skylight of a greenhouse from a helicopter, Florida
v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989); and require citizens to turn over examples of their handwriting, United States v. Mara, 410 U.S. 19 (1973), voice, United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1
(1973), or fingerprints, Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721 (1969). The rationale behind
these categorical exceptions is that these activities are not "searches" at all and therefore
fall outside the scope of the Fourth Amendment. In fact, they represent situations in which
the Court has balanced the citizen's privacy interest, and the governmental intrusion into
that privacy, against the administrative and law enforcement goals behind such activities
and has concluded that the expectation of privacy is so low as to require no Fourth Amendment safeguards.
Thus, in a modern Fourth Amendment case, the judge may weigh the reasonableness
of a search, or may hold that the domain invaded involved such a negligible expectation of
privacy that no "search" occurred-in effect finding, without explicitly holding, that the
police activity was in fact reasonable.
149. See David L. Faigman, ConstitutionalAdventures in Wonderland: Exploring the
Debate Between Rules and Standards Through the Looking Glass of the FirstAmendment,
44 HAsnrNos L.J. 829, 839 (1993); Stephen E. Gottlieb, The Paradoxof Balancing Significant Interests, 45 HASTINGS LJ. 825, 836 (1994) (observing that "the difference between
balancing and categorization has to do with which values are made explicit and which are
left as unarticulated judgments"); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Categorization, Balancing, and
Government Interests, in PUBLIC VALUES IN CONSTITUTONAL LAW 241 (Stephen E. Got-

tlieb ed., 1993); Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court 1991 Term Foreword: The Justices of Rules and Standards,106 HARV. L. REv. 22, 69 (1992).
150. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2900.

1562

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 45

Moreover, because an appellate judge will be limited to the facts
found at the trial level 151 when choosing among and applying categorical rules, those facts may be given undue weight. 152 A judge conscien-

tiously applying the rules to facts could be hamstrung into a certain
decision, with a strange result: The ultimate constitutional interpretation in a given case could be determined by the finder of fact. This
would subvert, or even nullify, the role of the appellate court in decid-

ing questions of law. 153 After Justice Scalia's announcement of the
per se "total diminution in value" test in Lucas, for example, the outcome of the case was essentially settled by the trial court's unreviewed

finding that Lucas's had been denied all economically viable use of his
parcel. Under a system of constitutional interpretation structured by
categorical rules, future reviewing courts will be bound by equally
questionable findings.

Conclusion
It is significant that the strongest language in favor of a categori-

cal nuisance exception appears in Supreme Court opinions (for both
the majority and the dissent) in which the Justices ultimately argue
that the exception does not apply. For example, in his Penn Central
dissent, Justice Rehnquist used a lengthy exposition of the nuisance
exception as a counter-example to bolster his argument that a taking
151. See FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a) ("Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given
to the opportunity of the trial court to judge of the credibility of the witnesses.").
152. The appellate court would be bound by the trial court's factual findings unless the
independent judgment rule, currently used in the First Amendment context, were adapted
to takings jurisprudence. The independent judgment rule requires an appellate court to
render its own judgment with regard to facts decisive of a constitutional claim. See, e.g.,
Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union, 485 U.S. 505, 514 n.31 (1984) (defamation); Time, Inc. v.
Pape, 401 U.S. 279, 284 (1971) (libel); see generally Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional
Fact Review, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 229, 239-47, 263-76 (1985) (discussing independent judgment and the First Amendment, and ultimately arguing that "constitutional fact review at
the appellate level is a matter for judicial (and legislative) discretion, not a constitutional
imperative").
In the defamation context, for example, the existence of "actual malice" is considered
a question of First Amendment law application, not one of historical fact. As such, the
trial court's determination is not given deference under Rule 52(a) and must receive independent judgment review by the appellate court. Likewise, in the takings context, the
propriety of appellate review would hinge on whether the trial court's finding that the
claimant was deprived of all economically viable use of his land were characterized as one
of historical fact (and thus governed by Rule 52(a)) or as one of Fifth Amendment law
application (and subject to independent judgment review).
153. This idea was suggested by Professor David L. Faigman of Hastings College of the
Law at a pre-symposium discussion held in February 1994.
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had occurred.' 5 4 Likewise, in Keystone the majority's strong support
of nuisance prevention was tempered by its refusal to establish an absolute exception, and by the balancing analysis ultimately used to justify the result.' 55 Finally, in Lucas, Justice Scalia's resurrection and
strengthening of the nuisance exception was also used as a counterexample to show that Lucas's land had been taken.15 6 Despite Justice

Scalia's strong rhetoric, the nuisance exception has yet to be successfully invoked to justify a confiscatory land use regulation.
The refusal of the Court to rest any case on the nuisance excep-

tion alone demonstrates its commitment to the balancing test. 57 Such
commitment should continue. The issues underlying most recent takings claims-such as the preservation of wetlands, open space, and
coastal zones-have only recently become broad-based societal concerns. The categorization of takings law threatens to petrify the jurisprudence and to prevent the Court from exercising one of its essential

functions: balancing public interests against private rights in unsettled, untested areas of law.

154. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 144 (1977) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting); see supra text accompanying note 23.
155. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470,492-93 (1987); see
supra text accompanying notes 81-82.
156. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2900-01 (1992).
157. Indeed, modem takings cases have consistently repeated Justice Holmes's admonition in Mahon. See, e.g., San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 649
(1980) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (stating the "general rule" in Mahon that determining a
taking is a "question of degree"); United States v. Cent. Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S. 155,
168 (1958) (stating that takings cases pose a "question properly turning upon the particular
circumstances of each case").

